The previous posts on Georgetown's pension obligations, as measured by unfunded liability and funded ratio, focused on how the health of the system
depends explicitly on the assumed growth rate of the pension fund managed by
the Texas Municipal Retirement Fund(TMRS). The Comprehensive Annual Financial
Report(CAFR) for 2014 provides the actual performance achieved in 2014. For
the year ended December 31, 2014, the annual money-weighted rate of return on
pension plan investments, net of pension plan investment expenses, was 5.85%.
The money-weighted rate of return expresses investment performance, net of
investment expense, adjusted for the changing amounts actually invested.
Using the TMRS reported
pension liabilities and assets, the 7% interest rate, and the 30 year
amortization period one can calculate the performance using the actual 2014
investment performance. Sparing the reader the mathematical details, the
results are:
unfunded
liability $57,000,000
funded ratio 60.2%
Thus it is clear
that the health of Georgetown's
pension fund is substantially less than reported by TMRS. A funded ratio of
60.5% is far less than the reported 83.3%.
The 10 year return
for TMRS is 6.5%, below the 7% target return. The surging stock market since
2009 has allowed TMRS to earn 8.6% over the previous 3 years and 7.4% over the
previous 5 years. It is apparent the annualized return is quite volatile and is
very depended on the time frame selected over which to average the returns. The
10 year return includes the market crash in 2008 and 2009. Moodys for instance recommends an average amortization period of 13 years.
There are other more
disturbing revelations in the 2014 CAFR. The TMRS Executive Director states
"The Systems portfolio is under a process of diversification and has
shifted from an income-oriented strategy to a total return approach similar to
most pension funds. The portfolio is diversified across all segments of the U.S. and
international equity markets (both developed and emerging). The fixed income
portfolio consists of core and non-core investments. The System also invests in
real return assets (currently global inflation-linked bonds), absolute return
strategies and real estate".
This is
"financial speak" for hey, we can't get 7% returns on conservative
U.S. equities and bonds, so we are increasing the risk to try and get higher
returns! For example, Real Return can include such investments as: commodities, inflation linked-bonds, oil & gas, timber, agriculture and precious metals.
Private Equity can include investments in distressed and bankrupt companies, providing venture
capital and leveraged buy-outs.
Absolute Return
primarily involves investments in hedge funds and includes various types of
arbitrage as well as short selling.
Even though these asset
classes, including real estate will only comprise about 25% of the portfolio, they will significantly increase the risk. Just two years ago, the portfolio held 1.9% in
Real Estate and 4.9% in Real Return and nothing in Absolute Return or Private
Equity.
The following table
indicates TMRS target asset allocations. The portfolio is still currently over-weighted in U.S. Equities and Core Fixed Income and there are no investments shown in Private Equity.
Asset
Allocation Table • Strategic Targets
Asset
Class Minimum % Target %
Maximum %
U.S.
Equities 12.5% 17.5% 22.5%
International
Equities 12.5% 17.5% 22.5%
Core
Fixed Income 25.0% 30.0% 40.0%
Non-Core
Fixed Income 5.0% 10.0% 15.0%
Real
Estate 5.0% 10.0% 15.0%
Real
Return 2.0% 5.0%
10.0%
Absolute
Return 0.0% 5.0% 10.0%
Private
Equity 0.0% 5.0% 10.0%
Cash
Equivalents 0.0% 0.0% 10.0%
The TMRS is aggressively moving its portfolio to higher risk investments in search of higher returns.
Even though the pension fund may not be in serious trouble right now, the pension fund is not in as rosy a position as reported. The City of Georgetown needs to be watching their pensions and make sure their liabilities are assessed using realistic investment return rates. Also, watch the risk being assumed by TMRS to meet unrealistic goals.